Pittsburgh University School of Law

Scholarship@PITT LAW
Articles

Faculty Publications

2007

Zapata Retold: Attorneys' Fees are (Still) Not Governed by the
CISG
Harry Flechtner
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, flechtner@law.pitt.edu

Joseph Lookofsky
University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Contracts Commons, European Law Commons, International
Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Harry Flechtner & Joseph Lookofsky, Zapata Retold: Attorneys' Fees are (Still) Not Governed by the CISG,
26 Journal of Law and Commerce 1 (2007).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_articles/255

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship@PITT LAW. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@PITT LAW. For more
information, please contact leers@pitt.edu, shephard@pitt.edu.

ARTICLES

ZAPATA RETOLD: ATTORNEYS' FEES ARE (STILL) NOT
GOVERNED BY THE CISG
Joseph Lookofsky" & Harry Flechtner**

How A REVOLUTIONARY MEXICAN HERO LOST

HIs CAUSE

In Viva Zapata (the 1952 movie), a Mexican revolutionary hero named
Zapata led a band of hungry peasants in a wild uprising against the
government in power. In the film, Zapata (played by Marlon Brando, himself)
scored some crowd-pleasing victories, but (historians tell us) the rule-making
powers ultimately prevailed, reigning in the Wild One and ending (forever)
Zapata's quixotic quest. I
How A REVOLUTIONARY MEXICAN PLAINTIFF LOST HIS CASE

Nearly fifty years later (in 2001), another Mexican revolutionary named
Zapata scored an improbable (initial) victory, this time in U.S. Federal District
Court, by persuading a trial judge to buy the argument (quite a wild one, in our
view) that Article 74 ofthe U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International

* Joseph Lookofsky holds his J.D. from New York University School of Law and his Cando Jur.
and Doctor Juris from the University of Copenhagen. He joined the University of Copenhagen Law Faculty
in 1981.
** Harry Flechtner is Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1.
See Bosley Crowther, "THE SCREEN IN REVIEW; Marlon Brando Plays Mexican Rebel Leader
in 'Viva Zapata!' New Feature at the Rivoli," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1952, available at http://
movies2.nytimes.comlmemlmovies!review.html?_r= I &titlel =Viva%20Zapata&title2=&reviewer=BOS
LEY%20CROWTHER&pdate=19520208&v_id=52942&oref=slogin.
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Sale of Goods 2 permits a successful claimant under the CISG to recover, as
damages for breach of contract, the attorney fees incurred in litigating the
claim. 3 According to this decision, Article 74 of the Convention pre-empts
(displaces) the long-standing "American rule" on attorney fees, which in U.S.
courts requires (with certain exceptions) that each litigant shoulder its own
attorneys' fees, win or lose.
At the time that District Court decision was issued, some CISG
commentators-including the leading one, Professor Peter Schlechtriem,
himself-expressed approval for the District Court's extension of the
Convention's sphere ofapplication to include the way in which national courts
allocate attorneys' fees. 4 In Pittsburgh and Copenhagen, however, the two of
us--operating independently as "lone wolves"-arrived at remarkably similar
positions that rej ected the decision' s (wildly) "expansionist" CI SG view. 5 Our
position was (and remains) based on several considerations, including the fact
that the Convention's travaux preparatoires contain nothing suggesting that
the drafters intended Article 74 to encompass the recovery of attorneys' fees
as damages,6 the fact that awarding attorneys fees as CISG damages would
yield absurd results,7 and the fact that permitting recovery of attorney fees as
damages under Article 74 of the Convention would contradict the
overwhelming majority (perhaps thousands) of CISG decisions from loser
pays jurisdictions, which have routinely awarded attorney fees not as damages
under the Convention, but on the basis of the loser-pays rules ofthe tribunals'

2.
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 98-9 (1983), 19 LL.M. 668 (1980) [hereinafter "CISG" or "Convention") (entered into
force on Jan. 1, 1988), available in 15 U.S.CA. app. at49 (West Supp. 1996),52 Fed. Reg. 6262-80, 7737
(1987), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/18 (1980).
3.
Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., No. 99-C4040. 2002 WL 398521
(N.D. TIL, Aug. 28, 2001), rev'd, 313 F. 3d 385 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1068 (2003).
4.
See Peter Schlechtriem, Case Comment: Attorneys' Fees as Recoverable Damages, 14 PACE
lNT'L L. REv. 205 (2002), reproduced at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem4.html.
5.
See Joseph Lookofsky, Comments on Zapata Hermanos v. Hearthside Baking [Attorneysfees:
CISG article 74 damages vs. Domestic procedural rules], 6 VJNDOBONA llNT'L COMM. ARB. 27 (2002);
Harry M. Flechtner, Recovering Attorneys' Fees as Damages under the u.N. Sales Convention: A Case
Study on the New International Commercial Practice and the Role Case Law in CISG Jurisprudence, with
Comments on Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. HearthsideBakingCo., 22 N.W. J.lNr'L L. &Bus. 121
(2002).
6.
This despite the fact that allowing such recovery would work a radical change not only in
jurisdictions that follow an "American-rule"-type approach. but also in States with domestic loser-pays
rules. See Flechtner, supra note 5. at 151-52.
7.
Such as limiting such recovery to successful claimants while denying reimbursement to parties
who successfully defend against claims ofbreach. See Joseph Lookofsky & Harry Flechtner, Viva Zapata!
American Procedure and CISG Substance in a U.S. Circuit Co Uri ofAppeal, 7 VINDOBONA llNr'L COMM.
ARB. 93, 97-98 (2003); Flechtner. supra note 5, at [52.
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domestic legal system. 8 As a result, we concluded, the question of
reimbursement for attorney fees incurred in the course of litigating a claim
under the CISG should be treated as a "procedural" issue beyond the scope of
the CISG and governed by the tribunal's domestic law. 9
In 2002, Circuit Judge Richard Posner (The Father ofLaw & Economics,
himself) reversed the District Court's (wild) decision, 10 thus "siding with US"II
and cutting the revolutionary Zapata plaintiff-and the CISG's Sphere of
Application-back down to size. Later that year, we (lone wolves) joined
forces to write Viva Zapatal,12 which explained (carefully) why the Zapata
trialjudge had reached the wrong result for the wrong reasons. At the same
time, we explained why Judge Posner, in reversing the trial court, reached the
right result for at least some of the right reasons-although he also fell into
some confusion. In particular, we emphasized what we then saw (and still
see) as an inconsistency between Posner's analysis and the implications ofhis
legal logic: although his opinion indicates that the "matter" ofattorneys' fees
is "governed, but not settled' by the Convention, the logic of Posner's ratio
actually leads to the conclusion that the attorneys' fees "matter" is simply not
governed by the CISG.
In December 2003 the U.S. Supreme Court put the final nail in the Zapata
plaintiff's coffin by refusing to grant a petition for certiorari,13 to the dismay
ofthose CISG-expansionist fans who had hoped for Supreme Court review. 14
THE ACADEMIC AFTERMATH

In this issue of the Journal Professor Schlechtriem presents his own
analysis of Judge Posner's decision in Zapata. ls As we did in our Viva

8.
See Flechtner, supra note 5, at 149-54.
9.
See Lookofsky, supra note 5; Flechtner, supra note 5, at 152-54.
10. Zapata Hennanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., Inc., 313 F. 3d 385 (7th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1068 (2003).
II. Without citing us (or any other academic authority), however.
12. Looko15ky & Flechtner, supra note 7.
13. Zapata Hennanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., Inc., 540 U.S. 1068 (2003).
14. See Association of Contract and Commercial Managers and the Institute of International
Commercial Law of the Pace University School of Law, Motion for Leave to File BriefAmicus Curiae and
BriefAmicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, zapata Hennanos Sucesores,
SA v. Hearthside Baking Co., Inc., 540 U.S. 1068 (2003) (No. 02-1318), available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/zamicus.html.
15. Peter Schlechtriem, Legal Costs as Damages in the Application of UN Sales Law, 26 J.L. &
COM. 71 (2007-08).
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Zapata! piece,16 Professor Schlechtriem reduces the ratio of the decision to
three main arguments. The first of these is that the Convention is about
contracts, not about procedure, and recovery ofattorneys 'fees is a matter of
procedure. Commenting on this argument, Professor Schlechtriem states: "In
international cases at least, without an international uniform classification the
categorization of a question as substantive or procedural can at best be a legal
far;on de parler [way of speaking] for a demarcation based on aspects of the
case, but it cannot answer the substantive issue itself.,,17 Now, we have no
problem with that (French) proposition, especially since Judge Posner himself
uses the substance-procedure distinction as a ''way of speaking." Quite
obviously (at least to Professor Posner and us), the Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods is mainly "about" substantive rules of
contracts: Just look at the name ofthe Convention, not to speak ofits content!
The common-sense logic of this argument is not refuted-or rendered
passe-by the fact the Convention also manages, en passant, to "say" a few
things about procedural matters such as the burden of proofs and proving
contracts by means ofwitnesses. 19
Commenting on the second head of Judge Posner's analysis, Professor
Schlechtriem concedes that the trial court's approach in Zapata would lead to
serious anomalies (another one of our arguments 20 ), and he attaches "great
weight" to Posner's (and oui l ) third (and final) argument that the United
States presumably would have abstainedfrom ratifying the CISG rather than
"abandon the hallowed American rule." Well, isn't that (just) like "saying"
(jar;on de parler) that the CISG was never intended to encompass recovery of
attorney fees because that was presumed to be a matter ofprocedure?
Judging by the tenor of his latest contribution, it hasn't been easy for
Professor Schlechtriem to abandon his original position, i.e., that the "matter"
of attorneys' fees is rightly regarded as a matter "governed, but not settled'
by the Convention, and it may be that he (if he "had his druthers") would
(still) prefer to use the CISG to the "settle" that matter. In any event,
Professor Schlechtriem has now (lamentingly) acknowledged the quixotic

See Lookofsky & Flechtner, supra note 7, at 96-100.
Schlechtriem, supra note 15, at 76.
18. See Harry M. Flechtner, Moving through tradition towards universalism under the UN. Sales
Convention (CISG): Notice of lack of conformity (Article 39) and burden of proof in the
Bundesgerichtshofopinion of 30 June 2004, in LIBER MEMORIAUS PETAR SARCEV1C: UNIVERSALlSM,
TRADIT!ON AND THE INDIVIDUAL 457 (Tomljenovic, Erauw & Volken eds. 2006).
19. See Article 11 of the Convention.
20. See Lookofsky & Flechtner. supra note 7, at 96-98.
21. ld.
16.
17.
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nature of such a quest. 22 Better than most, he can read the writing on the
American judicial wall: the American decision-makers have made their
decision, which will almost surely remain final, whatever (any) academics
might advise American judges to think.
Less lamenting (though perhaps more pugnacious) is the latest (2006)
"Advisory Opinion" rendered by the CISG Advisory Council (of which
Professor Schlechtriem is a most distinguished member), including the
following "black letter" proposition: "Under Article 74, the aggrieved party
cannot recover expenses associated with litigation of the breach."23 It is,
of course, hardly surprising that the (unanimous) Advisory Council Opinion
is clear and unequivocal: attorneys' fees cannot be recovered as damages
under the CISG. What one might wonder about is why the Council
(unanimously) stamps Judge Posner's (and our) substance-procedure
distinction as "outdated and unproductive"24 (which certainly sounds worse
than far;on de parler!). The Council is, of course, entitled to its opinion on the
substance-procedure issue, but we note that the "Opinion" on this particular
point remains a conc1usory assertion with virtually no documentation, except
for a somewhat curious invitation to "see" a scholarly article on the substance
procedure distinction as it relates to a completely different (conflict oflaws)
context. 25
Since we have explained and documented our own position (both
individually and collectively) on the attorney fee issue itself, we have little
more to say on that particular score.26 We do, however, take this opportunity
to comment on the Advisory Council Opinion "approach." In our view, that
approach suffers from two problems. First, it distorts our own use of the
substance-procedure distinction in determining the scope of the Convention.
Second, it appears to be based on a misunderstanding ofthe role and authority
of the Advisory Council itself.
On the first point, the Advisory Council Opinion states:
Some courts and commentators believe that the recovery of litigation expenses is a
procedural matter outside the scope ofthe Convention's substantive damages provisions

22. See Schlechtriem, supra note 15, at 76.
23. CISa Advisory Council Opinion No.6, Calculation of Damages under CISG Article 74,
heading 5 (2006).
24. ld. ~ 5.2.
25. ld. n.89 (inviting readers of the Council's Opinion to "See Carruthers, The Substance and
Procedure Distinction in Conflict of Laws: A Continuing Debate in Relation to Damages, 53 lNT'L &
COMPo LQ. 691 (2004).").
26. See the discussions cited in notes 5 & 7 supra.
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[citing, inter alia, our Viva Zapata piece] .... The issue of whether litigation expenses
should be considered as damages for purposes of Article 74 cannot be resolved through
a substance/procedure distinction. Whether a matter is considered substantive or
procedural may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and may depend on the
circumstances of a particular case. Relying upon such a distinction in this context is
outdated and unproductive. 27

This passage seems to suggest that we (Flechtner and Lookofsky) rely on the
substantive-procedural distinction as a test-in fact as the sole and exclusive
test-for determining whether the recovery ofattorney fees is covered by the
Convention. But that is hardly a reasonable reading of our analysis. In fact,
we have used the distinction between substance and procedure not as a legal
"test" for the Convention's scope, but as one of the tools available to
determine whether the CISG drafters intended to deal with attorney's fees in
the CISG.2 8 In other words, we have not invoked the substance-procedure
distinction as a (formalistic) "test" to determine whether the recovery of
attorneys' fees (matter) lies within the scope of the CISG; but rather as a tool
for determining and then expressing the apparent intent of the drafters (an
intent discovered without even referring to the substance-procedure
distinction) not to have the Convention govern the issue,29 and as an
explanation for why courts (and, presumably, the drafters of the text of the
CISG) simply assumed that the matter was beyond the scope of the
Convention-i.e., because they thought of it as a matter of procedure rather
than as a matter of substantive sales rules of the type provided in the
Convention.
This method of using the substance-procedure distinction (as a tool to
discern the CISG drafters' intent) is, we think, clearly justified, as the drafters
themselves employed the same distinction to determine the proper scope ofthe
Convention in another context: a proposal to add language to the Convention

27. CISG Advisory Council Opinion No.6, supra note 22, ~~ 5.1 & 5.2 (footnotes omitted).
28. Indeed, in Professor's Flechtner's discussion ofthe attorneys' fees question in the Northwestern
Journal oJInternational Law & Business, the substance-procedure distinction is not even mentioned until
the seventh paragraph (out of 10 devoted to the question). See Flechtner, supra note 5, at ISO-54. The
distinction is not brought up until after he argues that the drafters of the Convention did not intend Article
74 to cover attorney fees. as demonstrated by the fact that this vital question is never even mentioned in the
travaux preparatoires, that awarding attorneys' fees under Article 74 yields absurd results (an argument
on which the Advisory Council Opinion itself relies-see Council Opinion No.6, supra note 22, ~ 5.4.),
and that the overwhelming practice in decided CISG cases is, apparently, to treat the matter as a question
governed by the domestic law of the forum rather than by the Convention. F1echtner, supra note 5, at
147-48, 151-53. Accord Lookofsky & F1echtner, supra note 7, at 97-98.
29. The Advisory Council Opinion itself, of course, concludes that attorneys' fees are not intended
to be governed by th e CISG.

'.
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that would have expressly allocated the burden of proof concerning
conformity of delivered goods was rejected because "it was considered
inappropriate for the Convention, which relates to the international sale of
goods, to deal with matters of evidence or procedure."3o
This last fact leads to our second criticism of the Advisory Council
Opinion: since the Convention drafters themselves employed the substance
procedure distinction in determining the proper scope ofthe CISG, where does
the Council come by the authority to declare that distinction is not a proper
tool of analysis because it is "outdated and unproductive"? The Advisory
Council is, quite obviously, not an "international legislature"; unlike those
who drafted the Convention and utilized the substance-procedure distinction,
the Council is comprised merely ofself-appointed representatives ofthe CISG
scholarly community. It is certainly a distinguished group of scholars, but
organizing themselves into a (private) body gives their opinions no more
inherent authority concerning the meaning of the CISG than the opinions of
other scholars: Advisory Council opinions have authority only insofar as they
present a convincing analysis, and where those opinions depart from the
intention of those who have actual law-making authority-as clearly is the
case with regard to the substance-procedure distinction-the Council's
opinions have no authority whatsoever. The Advisory Council is welcome to
think (and opine) that the substance procedure distinction is "outdated and
unproductive," but the Council has not been authorized to excise the
distinction from scholarly Convention analysis when the drafters in fact
themselves used that distinction to explain what they thought was the proper
scope of the CISG.
Consider an analogous situation: Article 4(a) ofthe Convention excludes
from the scope of the CISG questions of "validity of the contract or of any of
its provisions, or of any usage." The distinction between validity and non
validity issues has also proven a difficult and elusive one that might also be
regarded as "outdated and unproductive." It would, nevertheless, be absurd
to think the Advisory Council (or any other private group or party) has the
authority to declare-as it has with regard to the substance-procedure
distinction-that questions concerning the scope of the Convention therefore
"cannot be resolved" by reference to the validity/non-validity distinction. It
is equally absurd to think that an Advisory Council Opinion can render the

30.

UNCITRAL, Report of the Committee of the Whole relating to the

International Sales ofGoods,

draft

Convention on the

1977, ~~ 177-178, reprinted in JOHN HONNOLD,DoCUMENTARY HISTORY OF

THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATION AL SALES: THE STUDIES, DELIBERATIONS AND DECISIONS THAT LED
TO THE

1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION WITH INTRODUCTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 330 (1989).
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substance-procedure distinction irrelevant. Whether members ofthe Advisory
Council like it or not, the distinction between substance and procedure,
remains-must remain-one of the tools that informed analysts employ in
determining the proper scope of the Convention: the drafters-those who in
fact were appointed to fashion the treaty and whose product defined what the
sovereign Contracting States agreed to--used the distinction for this purpose,
as evidenced by both the nature of the Convention and its travaux
preparatoires.
In the case of attorneys' fees the drafters, we believe, followed the
distinction between substance andprocedure-albeit probably unconsciously:
they appear to have assumed that the Convention does not deal with the
attorney fees issue (more precisely, it never occurred to them it might deal
with the issue) because they (would have) thought of it as a "matter" of
procedure. There is, as we have noted elsewhere, nothing at all in the travaux
preparatoires to suggest that the drafters ever contemplated the wild notion
that Article 74 (or any other CISG rule) "governed" the recovery of attorney
fees-this despite the issue's great importance not only in the U.S., but also
in loser-pays jurisdictions. 3 I So now, in 2007, it seems to us absurd "counsel"
that we should hide our eyes and ignore a distinction that the drafters
themselves invoked, merely because some academics (now) find that
distinction hard to use, "outdated" or "unproductive."
Of course we are taking an intent-oriented approach to interpretation. A
pure "textualist" might argue that the drafters' intent was irrelevant, and that
the "plain meaning" of Article 74 encompasses attorneys fees because it
covers all "losses" caused by a breach. We frankly have little regard for this
view of language and interpretation. What, for example, is the "plain
meaning" of the second sentence of Article 13, which provides that under the
Convention a contract of sale "may be proved by any means. ..." Since the
plain dictionary meaning of "any" is (of course) "any," the "plain meaning"
of the sentence is that courts applying the Convention must let the proponent
ofa contract prove its existence with (e.g.) hearsay evidence, by evidence that
domestic rules of evidence would block as prejudicial or violative of public
policy, by Ouija boards, by reading sheep entrails-in short by "any" means.
Obviously, that "plain meaning" is completely absurd, and the reason it is

31. In these jurisdictions domestic rules on recovery ofattorneys fees (which presumably would also
be pre-empted if the CISG governs the matter) sometimes feature anificial schedules of recoverab Ie fees
or reference to considerations (such as the amount in controversy) that are not relevant to the "actual
foreseeable loss" approach that would be mandated under Article 74. See Flechtner, supra note 5, at
152-53.
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absurd is because it ignores the intent behind the provision (which is to
prevent the indirect imposition of formality requirements through rules
limiting the kind of evidence needed to establish existence ofa contrad 2), and
because it fails to acknowledge that the Convention was in general not
intended to address procedural matters (such as evidentiary rules).
SUMMING

UP

We firmly maintain our original position that the recovery of the costs of
attorneys employed in litigating a claim under the Convention is a matter
beyond the scope of the ClSG, governed instead by the domestic law of the
forum as a procedural question. Now that all but the most obstinate
internationalists appear to have accepted the outcome of Judge Posner's
opinion in Zapata (which creates a judge-made fact that the CISG does not
pre-empt the "Americanrule"33), the attack has turned to Judge Posner's ratio,
especially to his use of the substance-procedure distinction (or, rather, the
somewhat distorted picture of that use that is attributed to both him and us).
Because we think those attacking critics fail to understand the real "ratio"
underlying the Zapata precedent-the simple but well-founded premise that
the ClSG does not govern the "matter" of attorneys' fees-we have (briefly)
re-entered the fray. Time will tell whether our own "Advisory Opinion" might
ultimately persuade others to see the issue in the light that we (continue to) do.

32. See Peter Sch1echtriem, Article 1l ~ 13, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTJON ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds.) (2d (English) ed.
2005).
33. At least not in the 7th Circuit (compare Schlechtriem,supra note 15, at 76), and given the highly
persuasive nature of Judge Posner's precedent, it will ahnost surely also be followed elsewhere. See
generally Joseph Lookofsky, Digesting CISG Case Law: How Much Regard Should We Have, 8
VINDOBONA J. INT'L COMM. L. & ARB. 181 (2004), also at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edulcisglbiblio/
lookofsky9.htm!.

